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limit myself to the most obvious suggestions; many
more will occur to all.
In this regard we may learn much from the
recent similar survey made of our colleagues of the
medical profession. The Report of the Committee
on the Costs of Medical Care is a mine of most im-
portant information, a great deal of which is directly
worth while for our own study in relation to our
own problems.' The violent adverse reaction of
the medical profession to the Report is, I fear, but
an indication of what we too may expect from the
rank and file of the bar; although anyone interested
in improving conditions in the administration of
justice must be hardened to expect such outbursts.
Nevertheless we can see certain errors which per-
haps we may avoid. This Committee was financed
by outside sources, the great advantage of which
was perhaps offset by the conviction of many that
a thesis must be and was proved and that argu-
ments were being sought for this thesis. The Re-
port may suggest to us profitable lines of inquiry
while enabling us to avoid the suspicions with
which it was viewed.
8. Medical Care for the American People, The Final Report of
The Committee on the Costs of Medical Care, 1932, together with other
publications of the Committee. Cf. alao the final Report of the Commis-
-ion on Medical Education (1932) which seems to have been more
favorably received by the medical profession.
Such a program on our part may well stimulate
activity of a more formal nature, possibly through
governmental sources. The experience of the Com-
mittee on the Costs of Medical Care would perhaps
indicate, however, that a careful investigation
sponsored by our own group alone may carry as
much if not more weight than one from any other
source.
I am confident that such activity on the part of
our Association is not only well worth while in the
light of its traditions, and well justified in the light
of the present demand, but is moreover a facing of
responsibility which will be well received by our
brethren of the bar and the general public as a start
on a program of possibly far-reaching social impli-
cations. If adopted, are we likely when we meet
a year hence to have before us a concrete result and
definite program of reform for the future? Cer-
tainly I hope not. Little more may in fact have
been accomplished by that time than the dramatiza-
tion of the fundamentally important issues involved.
Even that is a result of inestimable importance.
The long range search by the method of trial and
error for improvement of our profession will then
have been made, as I believe it should be, the cen-
tral activity of our Association.
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A SPORTSMANLIKE spectator demands a con-test in which the participants are not too un-evenly matched, and to some extent the history
of criminal procedure is characterized by judicial and
legislative innovations designed to accomplish a balance
of handicaps and advantages between the prosecuting
agency and the accused.
Perhaps the most sweeping attempt to secure this
balance came about in the century following the Eng-
lish Civil War. Prior thereto an accused was secretly
confined before trial without opportunity to prepare a
defense; he was given no intimation of the evidence
or witnesses to be used against him; he was not per-
mitted counsel, either prior to or at trial; there was no
guarantee of confrontation of witnesses; confessions
of accomplices were regarded as specially cogent evi-
dence; and the trial was an unequal battle between a
battery of prosecution counsel (each one of which
would devote himself to a particular segment of the
case) on the one side, and the privilege-shorn suspect
on the other.'
A wide-spread revulsion was inevitable and we
find much evidence of the balancing process which re-
sulted, in the bills of rights of American common-
wealths. If one were simply to list, without further
description, the rights of the accused at the various
stages of American criminal procedure today, the list
would be an imposing one. While most of these guar-
antees whether legislatively or otherwise enunciated,
would seem to be privileges which should be accorded
in any civilized community, others are either less funda-
mental manifestations of the vagaries of the public
mood or the work of defense lawyers in the law mak-
ing bodies who are unduly solicitous for the rights of
accused persons.
Today the balance is decidedly in favor of the ac-
cused. He is no longer the pitiful combatant of the
1. 1 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, pp. 325,
350.
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early 17th century who stood shackled before his perse-
cutors. His bonds have been loosed and a weapon has
been placed in his hands. It is unfortunate that in
speaking of the American trial one finds himself re-
sorting to the terminology of a contest, a temptation
which does not confront one accustomed to the conti-
nental criminal procedure which, despite its many un-
fair incidents, 'bears little resemblance to a game--more
to an earnest investigation into guilt or innocence.2
One of the most patent inequalities is bound up
with the so-called right of the accused to know the
prosecution's case, including the right to a copy of the
indictment with the charge adequately set forth, a bill
of particulars, the right to names of witnesses appear-
ing before the grand jury, the right (if prosecution be
commenced by preliminary hearing) to have the state's
case presented in prima facie form (and in some juris-
dictions in full), with no counter obligation upon the
accused to reveal the nature of his defense unless it
be by way of abatement; but rather, a privilege to re-
main silent, except for an uninformative plea of "not
guilty" until the waning hours of the trial when the
surprise defense may be dramatically ushered in to
the delight of the spectators and the detriment of law
enforcement.
4
The breadth of the general issue in civil cases
and abuses arising therefrom moved Bentham and his
followers to agitate reforms which culminated in the
Hilary Rules of 1834. There never has been any such
wave of indignation directed at the corresponding
abuses under the criminal plea of not guilty, and the
various motions, demurrers and pleas which may be
made upon arraignment remain virtually the same to-
day as when Hale, Hawkins, and Blackstone expounded
upon them.'
In a suit on a promissory note the pleadings in-
form the plaintiff whether the defense is a denial of
execution or nonpayment. In a criminal case the plead-
ings tell nothing, and at the appropriate moment the
defendant with a perjured defense has his choice of a
corps of insanity experts, alibi witnesses who will tes-
tify that he was in another locality at the time of the
offense, friends who will assert he acted in self-defense,
was entrapped into committing the crime, that he
labored under mistake or ignorance of law or fact, that
he was an infant, coerced, intoxicated, immune from
prosecution, or otherwise justified. The prosecution
flounders in the dark. There is a last minute futile
attempt to collect rebuttal evidence. Reasonable -doubt
has been raised. An acquittal follows, and the books
on trial tactics have another illustration on how to "beat
the case" through surprise.
Why should not a defendant be required either to
state his defense in writing at the time of arraignment
in clear and concise language or, what would seem more
2. See generally, Wright- "French Criminal Procedure," (1928)
44 Law Q. Re. 324, (1929) 45 Law Q. Rev 92' Westenhavee "What
lappns in a French Criminal Trial,' (1925) 31 Xest VirienCa L. 0.
237, 244, 547; Garner, "Criminal Procedure in France" (1916) 25 Yale
L. Jour. 252; Coudert, "French Criminal Procedure,' (1910) 19 Yale
L. Jour. 32f, 337.
2. See argument advanced in (1932) 6 Aust. L. Jour. 175, 176.
See also Freeman, "Should the Defendant in a Criminal Case File a
Written Pleading Outlining His Defense?" (1923) 8 Minn. L. Rev. 357.
4. See Millar, "The Function of Criminal Pleading," (1922) 12 J.
Crim. L. 500, 504.
5 See a Hale, Pleas of the Cenwe, ist Am ei. 1047, p. 000 et
eeq.; and 4 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, 7th ed. 1795, p. 243 et seq.;
Blackstone Commentaries, Cooley's 3rd rev. ed., vol. 2, pp. 482-486;
Clark's Crim. Proc., 2nd ed. p. 429 et seq.
With the exceeptin of the Declinatory pleas (including sanctuary
and clergy) virtually the same pleas are available today. The method
of raising the defense differs somewhat in the jurisdictions. What was
once raised by special plea in abatement or by demurrer is now, in some
risdictions, raised by motion to quash. Section 209 of the American
w institute Model Code of Criminal Procedure indicates the trend.
Section 210 lists the grounds for a motion to quash. But the issues
raised by the plea of not guilty renain the same today as at common
law. See note (1929) 28 Yale L. Jour. 650.
practicable in most cases, present an oral titular desig-
nation of such defense, either as a special plea or as a
specification under the plea of "not guilty."
The very naivet6 of Hale's historical explanation
why justification is not to be pleaded speciallyt makes
it most apparent that there is no particular sanctity in
the present arrangement of criminal pleas, and within
the last few years a small group of states, convinced
that law enforcement would be best served by a break
with tradition, have decided to experiment with in-
formative defense pleadings. If there has been a Ben-
tham in the movement he is Prof. Robert W. Millar.
Eight jurisdictions require the defendant to give
advance notice of an insanity defense; at least two
jurisdictions9 make the same requirement with refer-
ence to alibi, while Scottish law 0 extends the require-
ment to alibi, insanity, that defendant was asleep, and
that the crime was committed by another person named.
Alibi
In 1927 the Michigan Crime Commission waged
a successful campaign for the adoption of a statute re-
quiring the defendant who proposed to offer alibi evi-
dence, to give notice of that intention, and his where-
abouts, at least four days before trial, to the prose-
cuting attorney.1 Many defense lawyers, both before
and after its passage, bitterly opposed the measure
which has since survived attack and been at least in-
ferentially sustained by the Michigan Supreme Court.t
2
Says Harry S. Toy, Prosecuting Attorney of Wayne
County (Detroit) :11
"The great increase in convictions where alibis have been
offered since the passage of the act is attributed by police and
prosecuting officials to the statutory notice given them, which
permits an inquiry into the alleged facts of the alibi prior to
trial and the refutation and destruction of a false alibi."
As the Michigan law now operates, perjury has
been materially checked:
"Instances have arisen where an alibi has been offered as
a defense after notice given under the Alibi act and the police
and prosecuting officials have been able to prove that the alibi
witnesses comnitted perjury. Several perjury convictions have
6. "In ease of an indictment of felony or treason there can be
no justifieation made, as a man cannot plead that what he did was
se defendendo, or in his defense against a burglar or robber, though
it amount in truth to no felony.
"And the reason is, because the indictment s-pposeth in treason, that
the fact was done proditorie & contra lieaat'ae aa detitua, and in
felony, that the fact was done feloinice, which is the point of the indict-
ment, and must be answered directly, but upon not guilty pleaded he
shall have the advantage of all such defenses, as he can make to acquit
himself of the felony or treason, and may give all his special defense
in evidence tho the matter of fact be proved upon him, and so it is
the most advantageous plea for the prisoner.
"If duress and compulsion from others will excuse him or his own
necessary defense in safeguard of his life, or any other matter, the jury
upon the general issue ought to take notice of it, and to find their
verdict accordingly, as effectually as if it were or could be specially
pleaded." Hale, supra, nt. 5, p. 258.
7. See: Millar, "rhe Function of Criminal Pleading," (1922) 12
J. Crim. L. 5 00; Millar, "The Modernization of Criminal Procedure,"(1920) 11 J. Crim. L. 344; Millar, "Reform of Criminal Pleading in
Illinois," (1917) 8 J. Crim. L. 337 at 359. Since the preparation of
this arti le Prof. Millar has published another article dealing with '"The
Statutory Notice of Alibi," (1934) 24 J. Crim. L. 849.
8. Alabama, California, Colorado, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wash-
ington and Wisconsin. See infra, nt. 28-33, 36, 37.
9. Michigan and Ohio. See infra, nt. 11, 15.
10. Keedy, "Criminal Procedure In Scotland," (1913) 3 J. Crim.
L. 728, at 751; Wood and Renton, Criminal Procedure, pp. 73, 519.
11. Mich. Comp. Laws (1909) §§ 17313, 17314:
"Whenever a defendant in a criminal case not cognizable by a jus-
tice of the peace shall propose to offer in his defense testimony to estab-
lish an alibi on behalf of the defendant or the insanity of such defend-
ant either at the time of the alleged offense or at the time of trial, such
defendant shall at the time of arraignment or wsithin ten (to) days there-
after but not less than four (4) days before the trial of such cause file
and serve upon the prosecuting attorney in such cause a notice in writing
of his intention to claim such defense and in cases of a claimed alibi such
notice shall include specific informeaioi as to the place at which the
accused claims to have been at the tine of the alleged offense
"Same: effect of failure to file naice. In the event of the failure
of a defendant to file the written notice prescribed in the preceding ec-
tion, the court may in its discretion exclude evidence offered be such
defendant for the purpose of establishing an alibi or the insanity of such
defendant as set forth in the preceding section."
12. People v. Marcus, 253 Mich. 410, 235 N. V. 202 (1931). See
also People v. Atiller, 250 Mich. 72, 229 N. V. 475 (1930); People v.
'Vudarski, 253 2 ,ie. 83, 234 N. V. 157 (1282).
12. (1931) 9 The Panel 52.
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resulted on that score in Detroit... Prosecuting and police
officials of this County are firmly convinced that the present
Michigan Alibi and Insanity Defense Law is a step in the
right direction and that it prevents many miscarriages of
justice.""
In 1929 the Criminal Law Committee of the Ohio
State Bar Association drafted an alibi defense statute
containing virtually the same language as the Michigan
statute, and secured its enactment.5 Previously there
had been many abuses of the alibi defense.16
The extent to which some defendants will go with
a perjured defense is illustrated by the case of Hymie
Martin, a notorious gunman who when arrested in
Pittsburgh for a murder committed in Cleveland se-
cured a writ of habeas corpus and at the hearing pro-
duced alibi witnesses who testified that he was in Pitts-
burgh on the night in question. Disbelieving the wit-
nesses the court refused to release the suspect and he
was extradited to Ohio where he was indicted. He
served notice required by the Ohio alibi law, in which,
to the amazement of all he stated that on the night of
the murder he was in Akron, Ohio."7
Under the Ohio law, the popularity of the alibi
defense waned. Criminals found that an alibi defense
refuted in open court was worse than no defense at all.
The requirement of advance notice robbed this defense
of its most valuable quality, i.e., the surprise element.
All this was apparent two months after the enactment
of the law, according to Miss Leona Marie Esch, Op-
erating Director of the Cleveland Association for Crim-
inal Justice."0
The Ohio Supreme Court, in a case not directly
presenting constitutional questions, 9 upheld the lower
court which had refused to admit evidence of alibi in
the absence of an advance specification. 0
In spite of the able sponsorship of State Attorney-
General John J. Bennett, Jr., Judge Charles C. Knott,
Jr.,21 and Thomas S. Rice, vigorous associate editor of
The Panel22 the New York legislature has three times
voted down a similar statute in that state.
In 1926, the Section of Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure of the California Bar Association recommended
the adoption of such a statute but the efforts of this
committee, the district attorneys of the state, and the
California Crime Commission were unavailing when
the legislature met in 1931."
The attorney general's office has recommended to
14. ibid. That perjury would be reduced under such a law was
one of the strongest arguments leading to the enactment. See Millar,
"The Modernization of Criminal Procedure," supra, at. 7, p. 350.
15. Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1931) §13444-20. The notice under this
statute must be given not less than THREE days before trial.
16. "No matter how carefully witnesses were subpoenaed, no mat-
ter how thoroughly their memories were tested, no matter how accurately
their statements were reduced to writing, no matter how painstakingly the
state prepared its case, alibi witnesses' would pop up in the courtroom
to prove that the defendant was not on the East side but on the West
side of the city, or in Chicago. or New York, or somewhere else but
NEVER ON THE SCENE OF THE CRIME at the time of its com-
mission." Eseh, "Ohio's New 'Alibi Defense' Law," (1931) 9 The
Panel 42.
17. id. p. 43.
18. id. p. 42.
19. State v. Nooks, 123 Ohio St. 190, 174 N. E 743 (1930). See
also State v. Thayer, 124 Ohio St. 1, 170 N. E. 656 (1931).
20. The defendant was indicted for larceny and "offered a wit-
ness, during the trial, for the purpose of proving an alibi. The state
objectad as no written notice had been given, pursuant to the [alibi)
statute, and the objection was sustained. The court of appeals then
reversed the judgment, holding the testimony to be competent regard-
less of the statute, as it tended to disprove the truth of the state's wit-
ness, but the supreme court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the
decision of the trial court, saying:
'To hold that there was an abuse of discretion under this record is
to deprive section 13444-20 of any force and effect, as it is difficult to
conceive how any alibi testimony in a criminal case would not tend to
disprove the testimony offered by the state upon the point of the where.
abouts of the accused at- the time and place of the commission of the
offense.' "-Chasoblin "Failure to Plead Insanity as a Defense," (1982)
6 Cinn. L. Rev. 313, at 816.
21. (1931) 9 The Panel 49,58.
22. (1933) 11 The Panel 27.
28. Report, Calif. Crime Comm. (1931) p. 10; id. (1933) p. 18.
the present federal congress the adoption of such a
statute.
Under both the Michigan and Ohio statutes, alibi
is not raised by a separate plea, but by specification
under the general issue. Both statutes provide that in
the event defendant fails to submit advance notice, the
court may in its discretion exclude alibi evidence. This
grant of discretion seems a wise insertion both from
the standpoint of the prosecution and the accused.
Without such a penalty the requirement of the special
plea would be a most ineffective gesture.2 4 While the
cases will be rare in which the court should permit
proof of an unannounced alibi, occasionally a defendant
will be called upon, in a tardy prosecution, to recall and
substantiate his presence at a given place on a night
some years previous. When such a case arises the
discretion may be exercised so as not to penalize a
defendant who has not had time to refresh his memory.
Insanity
With such unsolved fundamental problems in the
insanity field as the bases for criminal responsibility,
the adequacy of insanity tests, the need for the creation
of agencies for pre-trial psychiatric examinations, and
the ultimate disposition of the mentally unsound, only
the most superficial surface-scratching can be accom-
plished by tinkering with such purely mechanical inno-
vations as the special plea of insanity. Our contribu-
tion is rendered all the more slight when it is realized
that, contrary to popular opinion, the insanity defense
is raised in comparatively few cases. 3
However, by requiring advance notice of intention
to present an insanity defense, some of the surprise
element will be eliminated, and feigned insanity may be
discouraged. California statistics indicate that such a
requirement will not necessarily result in fewer such
pleaS26 although that has apparently been the result in
Michigan."
In Alabama,18 California,2 9 Ohio, 0 Washington, 1
Wisconsin,32 and Indiana, 0 the defense of insanity at
the time of the offense must be raised by a special
plea, and unless it is so raised, no evidence of insanity
may be presented at the trial. Louisiana had a similar
statute, 4 but in 1932 the section of the Code contain-
ing the provision for a special plea was amended and
re-enacted omitting any reference to such a plea. 5
In Colorado" and Michigan t insanity must be
raised by a specification under the general issue. Un-
less so raised it cannot be shown under "not guilty" in
24. New York and Nebraska provide for special pleas of insanity,
but notwithstanding, permit insanity evidence to be offered under the
general issue. See infra, nt. 3S, 39.
25. "The Illinois Crime Survey, p. 213, states that the number of
defendants found insane by juries in the various municipalities and
counties covered by the survey vary from less than 1 per 1000 cases to
1.5; and that 'the issanity defense has great publicity in a few homicide
cases and creates the impression that a large number escape in that way.'
On p. 757 there are more detailed statistics of Cook County, showing in
four years a total of only 11 findings of insanity in murder cases and
40 in all eases . . . The California . report discloses (p. 37)
that in 8,336 cases there were 98 pleas of insanity, or a little over one
percent, and that of these 98 only 13 were successful, and in ,. majority
of these the district attorney either stipulated that the defendant was
insane or the experts called by the state testified that the defendant
was insane." Bettman, Criminal justice Surieys Analysis, vol. 4, Report
of The Wickersham Commission, p, 129, 110.
26. Report of the Calif. Crime Comm. (1931) p. 35.
27. (1931, 9 The Panel 52.
28. Ala. Code (MPichie, 19298) §4573.
29. Cal. Pen. Code (Deering, 1931) §1016.
30. Ohio Gen. Code 1930, §13440-2.
31. Wash. Camp. Stat. (Remington, 1922) §3174.
32. Vis. Stat. (1931) §257.11(1).
33. Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1926) §2231. Insanity however is
admissible in mitigation, though not pleaded. Hopkins v. State, 180 Ind.
293, 102 N.E. 851 (1913).
34. La, Code Crim. Proc. act, 267; State v. Harville, 170 La. 991,
129 So. 612 (1930).
35. Act 136 La Reg. Ses. 1988, p. 449.
30. Colo. Laws 1927, c. 90, 11.
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the former state, and may be excluded by the judge
in the latter.
In New York38 and Nebraska" the defendant may
make a special plea of insanity, but evidence of in-
sanity is neverthelass admissible under the general is-
sueU a rather impotent provision, it would seem .
While three other states, Maine,4' Maryland, 2 and
New Hampshire," make no requirement with reference
to special pleas in insanity cases, their statutes appear
to contemplate such pleas, and such pleas would not
be rejected as they have been in other states.4 4
The Code of Criminal Procedure of the American
Law Institute contains a provision, similar to that in
Michigan and Colorado requiring a specification in ad-
vance of trial.45  And the Missouri Crime Survey
4
and the \Wickersham Commission" contain recommen-
dations approving such a statute.
Other Defenses
It is submitted that the specification of defense
should be extended to all defenses, leaving as the
scope of the plea of "not guilty" the questions whether
or not the acts charged took place and whether the
accused committed them. Hidden away in the volum-
inous report of the Wickersham Commission is this sig-
nificant recommendation.
The accused, who has participated in the commis-
sion of crime, is in a position to know the circumstances
tinder which his acts were committed. The prosecution
is not. If the defendant was not at the scene of the
crime, he knows that fact, and he also knows something
the prosecution may never know, namely, where he was
at the time of its commission. If he is innocent be-
cause his conduct falls within some legal excuse or
justification, he would not be prejudiced by a statutory
compulsion to specify such excuse or justification. If
he is guilty no constitutional guarantee for the pro-
tection of the innocent should shield him.
From the standpoint of saving time and expense
in the prosecution of criminal cases, the requirement of
advance notice of defense would be fully justified. If
a defendant wishes to raise the defense of entrapment,
for instance, a defense which by its very nature admits
the commission of the act charged, why should there
be placed upon the prosecution the burden of collecting
evidence, often a costly and time consuming task, which
would simply tend to place the defendant at the scene
of the crime. Entrapment is frequently urged as a
defense in prosecutions for illegal sales of liquor and
narcotics. 49  If in truth the only real issue is whether
or not there has been a sufficient degree of persuasion
or participation by the enforcement officers, why should
the state be required to flounder in the dark, possibly
even abandon the case because evidpnce is wanting
which would place the defendant at the scene of the
act, where he, if he could be required to, would admit
that he was. 0
Where the defense is based upon a promise of
37. Mich. Com. Laws (1929) Uf17313. 17314.
38. N. Y. Code Crim. Pros. §336; Gilbert's Pen. Code and Crim.
Law Ann. 1933.
39. Net. Comp. Stat. (1919) §29-2204.
40. ibid.; Ostrander v. People, 28 Hun. 38 (1882); People v.
Joyce, 283 N. Y. 61, 134 N.E. 836 (1922).
41. Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 149, 1.
42. Aid. Ann. Code (Bagby 1924) art. 59, §6, as amended Laws
1931, e. 436, p. Ills.
43. N. IT. Puob. Laws 1926, c. 369, §2.
44. State v. Branton, 33 Ore. 533, 550, 56 Pac. 267 (1899).
45. A. L. I. Model Code Crim. Proc. §265.
46. Mo. Crime Sorrey pp. 3711373.47. Report, Wickersh comm ssbnn, vol. 8, p. 34.
48. ibid.
49. Note (1929) 2 S. C. L. Rev. 283 and authorities cited in note
to Srrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435, 444, 53 Sup. Ct. 210, 213
(1932).
50. It is not suggested here that legislation be enacted making the
immunity 1 made by enforcement officers in consider-
ation that the defendant either give information con-
cerning accomplices or the whereabouts of loot, or in
consideration that he turn state's evidence, no unfair-
ness would result in requiring advance notice of such
defense. The defense is essentially one in abatement.
The same is true of other defenses, but particu-
larly true of condonation. While this defense is de-
cidedly limited it makes its appearance in jurisdictions
where statutes have been enacted which call for a dis-
missal of the case where in rape52 and seduction 3 the
parties later marry, and in adultery where the prosecu-
tion is not instituted upon the complaint of the ag-
grieved spouse." Since the perfect example of
condonation is the grant of executive clemency through
pardon, and since pardon had to be raised by a special
plea at common law, 5 it should not be regarded as a
novel suggestion that condonation in its less perfect
form be the subject of advance specification.
Most defenses, 0 unlike alibi which is exceedingly
hard to refute at the last moment, and unlike immunity
which may properly be classed as one in abatement, are
defenses which are not usually difficult to refute, and
which go to the merits. But even assuming that the
cases where the surprise element hinders effective prose-
cution are the exception rather than the rule it would
seem that whatever slight inconvenience may result
to the accused from advance specifications is out-
weighed by the slight advantage accorded the prosecu-
tion by virtue of which defenses may be tested in ad-
vance of trial.
Obviously any attempt to confine defendants to
one defense only would be unreasonable and unfair and
would immediately be labelled unconstitutional, at least
where consistent defenses are proferred. 1 But to re-
quire that defenses be announced in advance of trial
does not deprive a defendant of such defenses. He
may select any defenses applicable to his situation. No
defense is made unavailable to him unless by his own
choice he discards it through failure to specify.
But if the failure to specify such defenses in ad-
vance of trial is to work a forfeiture of the right to
introduce evidence tending to establish such defenses,
will not counsel make a practice of enumerating all
defenses in their specifications?58 This hardly seems
a likely prospect, but if it becomes such, there are
methods of correcting such an abuse. Statutes might
be enacted prohibiting the enumeration of inconsistent
defenses in the specification. But the most effective
counter-irritant might be supplied by giving to the
prosecutor if he needs a grant of power in this re-
spect58 the right to comment upon the fact that defenses
specified were not established by evidence at the trial,
or that the defenses offered were inconsistent. To pre-
51. See Seribner v. State, 90 Okla. Cr. 456, 132 Pac. 933 (1913);
State v. Sine, 91 V. Va. 608, 114 S.E. 150 (1922).
52. N. c. Code (tichie, 1931) §4209; 1 N. C. L. Rev. 286.
53. Mterrell v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. Rep. 19, 57 S.W. 289 (1900);
Cal. Pen. Code (Deering, 1931) §269; N. C. Code (Miehie, 1911) §4339.
54. People v. Dalrymple, 55 Mich. 519, 22 N. V. 20 (1885).
55. Clark's Cr. Proc. (2nd ed.) §139.
56. By "defenses" is meant anything which if established would
acquit the defendant.
57. Statute depriving defendant of defense of insanity was held
unconatitutional in State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 Pac. 1020
(1910). See Rood, "Statutory Abolition of the Defense of Insanity in
Criminal Cases," (1911) 16 Va. L. Reg. 721.
58. See note (1929) 38 Yale L. Jour. 650, 656.
59. See 9 The Panel 42, 43; 12.
specification of entrapment alone an admision of presence at the scene
of the offense and participation therein. The objections to such a pro-
cedure are discussed in the conclusion to this article. The real advan-
tage of advance specification would lie in the notice given to the prose-
cotor that entrapment is the vital issue-the real defense. Knowing this
the prcsecution could he content with a lesser quantum of proof tending
to identify defendant and place him at the scene, and could throw its
detective resources into destroying the entrapment defense,
ADVANCE SPECIFICATIONS OF DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL CASES
sent to the jury a long list of the defenses specified and
to then proceed to ridicule the list would be far more
damaging than any restrictin on pleading inconsistent
defenses. A jury is rightfully suspicious of a man
who claims an alibi and who offers evidence of self-
defense.
Any change in the procedural law which disturbs
the existing alignment of handicaps and advantages,
however unbalanced it may now be, between accused
and prosecutor, is certain to be met with cries of un-
constitutionality, and it would therefore seem appro-
priate to anticipate such objections.
In 1927 California created a new plea of "not
guilty by reason of insanity."' By statute it was pro-
vided that if such plea were used alone, the defendant
thereby admitted the commission of the offense
charge;0 ' and if the plea of "not guilty" were used
alone, the defendant was conclusively presumed
to have been sane at the time of the offense
charged. 2 If the defendant joined with the insanity
plea another plea, he was first to be tried as if he had
entered the other plea only, and for purposes of such
trial was presumed sane, following which a separate
trial was provided on the insanity issue. 3
In the first case involving the constitutionality of
the statute, People v. Hickman," the defendant entered
only the insanity plea and upon a finding of sanity, was
sentenced. He urged upon appeal that having been
confined to the insanity issue he had been denied due
process and equal protection of the laws under the 14th
amendment. The court held that he had had ample
opportunity to choose appropriate pleas and that he
was not therefore deprived of anything which he could
not have availed himself of.
In People a. Davis,5 the defendant entered both
a plea of "not guilty" and one of "not guilty by reason
of insanity," and although he had ample opportunity
to present insanity evidence at the second hearing his
appeal was based upon the court's refusal to permit
the introduction of insanity evidence at the first hear-
ing. Following the reasoning in the Hickman Case,"
the court held that the procedure was valid if at some
time he was permitted to have his insanity determined
by the jury6
In People v. Leong Fook' 8 and People v. Troche
6 9
the defendants entered pleas of "not guilty" and of-
fered evidence of insanity under such pleas which was
rejected by the court. In opinions which stress the
procedural nature of the statutory change, and which
rely heavily and unnecessarily upon the affirmative na-
ture of the insanity defense,76 the court held that the
legislature could constitutionally exclude evidence of
insanity on a "not guilty" plea, where opportunity was
given to choose a plea by which insanity could be raised.
In none of the cases was the court troubled par-
ticularly with the validity of that portion of the statute
which simply required a defendant to choose the ap-
propriate plea or forfeit the right to raise it at trial.
Its real problem was whether insanity was such a vital
inseparable factor in the determination of guilt as
60. Cal. Pen. Code (Deering, 1031) §1016.
01. ibid.
62. Cal. Pen,. Code (Deering, 1931) §1026.
63. ibid.
64. 204 Cal. 470, 268 Pa. 909, 270 Pae. 1117 (1928).
65. 94 Cal. App. 192, 270 Pae. 715 (1928).
66. Supra, nt. 64.
67. 217 Poc. 715, 716 (1928).
68. 206 Cal. 64, 278 Par. 779 (1W28).
69. 206 Cal. 35, 278 Par. 767 (1928). Appeal dismissed 280 U. S.
624 (1929)
70. See Shepherd "The Plea of Insanity under the 1927 Amend.
ments to the California Penal Code," (1929) 3 So, Cal. L. Rev. 1, at
p. 6 et seq.
could not be detached from the guilt issue for de-
termination in a separate hearing.71
The first problem would seem to be a relatively
simple one and yet a dictum of the Ohio court in a
recent case 7 2 leaves uncertain the disposition which will
be made of the Ohio insanity law when a proper case
is presented:
"We do not deem it necessary under this record to con-
sider the refusal of.the court under Section 13440-P, Ohio Gen-
eral Code (113 Ohio Laws 175) to permit testimony to be
offered as to the insanity of the accused at the time of the com-
mission of the offense, nor to go into the question of the grave
doubt as to the constitutionality of the provision establishing
a conclusive presumption of sanity from the failure of the
attorney to file a written plea of not guilty by reason of in-
sanity. Two of the members of this court, including the writer
of this opinion, are convinced that an enactment which would
deprive an insane person of a defense going to the very vitals
of his case, because of non-action upon the part of his at-
torney, would necessarily be unconstitutional, upon the ground
that it would deprive such insane person of due process of
law.""'
It is submitted that on the basis of the above
reasoning, the Ohio statute is no more a deprivation of
due process than a denial by a trial judge of a defend-
ant's request to change a plea, entered by his attorney,
from guilty to not guilty.
With the dictum in the above case may be com-
pared the language of the Alabama Supreme Court in
a case
4 
upholding the constitutionality of the statute
of that state which provides for a separate insanity
plea:
"The rule is well settled in this state that the action of the
tria' court in refusing to allow additional pleas to be filed after
the time prescribed by law is not revisable on appeal [citing
cases]. We see no reason for making an exception in favor
of the plea of 'not guilty by reason of insanity.' Section 7176
of the Code requires that this plea must be interposed at the
time of arraignment, and failure to do so forfeits the right, and
leaves the acceptance of the plea thereafter to the unreviewable
discretion of the trial court. . . There is no merit in the sug-
gestion that the enforcement of this rule of practice is a viola-
tion of the defendant's constitutional right 'to be heard by
himself and counsel, or either.'""
The proposal for a more extended use of special
pleas in criminal cases is not, however, complicated by
any of the constitutional problems such as arose out of
the California statute which provided for separate trials
on separate pleas. The proposal involves no attempt
to separately try the issue of self defense, for instance,
and the other issues that may be raised today under the
not guilty plea. Such a procedure would be a farce,
for the elements constituting self defense are so inter-
linked with the other proof which would be adduced
that a separate trial of the self defense issue would
simply result in duplicate hearings. The proposal in-
volves one trial only, but advance notice of the de-
fenses which are to be raised therein.
Is due process violated when one is given the
choice of any defenses suitable to his situation, but is
permitted to assert them at trial only if preceded by a
notice of such intention? In the Troche Case7  the
court said:
"Due process of law is not limited to the due process of
the settled usages of the past, but may include new methods of
procedure unknown to the common law, provided they are in
71: On reargunient before the California Supreme Court in People
v. Troche, supra, nt. 69, the court submitted this question to which it
invited counsel to devote their arguments: "Whether any ev dence bear-
ing on the mental conditio of the defendant at the time the offense is
alleged to have been committed is admissible for the purpose of showing
intent or premeditation, or for the purpo se of enabling the jury to deter-
mine the degree of the offense charged, and the extent of the punish-
ment." Argument of Attorney General Webb, n. 88.
72. Evans v. State, 123 Ohio St. 182, 174 N.E. 348 (1910).
73. id. p. 138.
74. Rohn o. State, 106 Ala. 5, 65 So. 42 (1910).
75. id. 65 So. at 42,
76. Supra, nt. 69.
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harmony with the accepted underlying principles of such pro-
cedure according to the traditions of the common law. They
must be orderly and provide for reasonable notice and op-
portunity to be heard.""
The California cases 78  construing the insanity
statute of that state would seem to present ample argu-
ment for sustaining legislation extending the use of
special pleas or specifications to other defenses.
The constitutional objection which might con-
ceivably prevail against alibi statutes -such as those in
Michigan and Ohio, is that the procedure in effect re-
quires the defendant to be a witness against himself.
The provision against self-incrimination exists in forty-
six of the states7 9 including Michigan" ° and Ohio."'
The wording of the guarantee is the same in 'both these
states: "No person shall be compelled in a criminal
case to be a witness against himself." The alibi statutes
differ from the insanity statutes in that in the former
the defendant must not only specify his defense or
forfeit the right to raise it at the trial, but he must also
state where he was at the time the offense was com-
mitted. The statute thus compels the defendant who
proposes to offer such a defense to furnish particulars
concerning the evidence which will establish it. It
may he argued that this is the equivalent, at least, of
testimonial compulsion, the very thing which the consti-
tutional provisions were designed to prevent.8 2 It is
true that the privilege against self-incrimination has
not been applied to criminal pleas or pleadings,8 but it
is also true that no statutes have heretofore required
of a defendant what the alibi statutes now require.
It is submitted, however, that the alibi statutes
do not infringe on the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Rather, they set up a wholly reasonable rule of
pleading which in no manner compels a defendant to
give any evidence other than that which he will volun-
tarily and without compulsion give at trial. Such
statutes do not violate the right of a defendant to be
forever silent. Rather they say to the accused: If
you don't intend to remain silent, if you expect to
offer an alibi defense, then advance notice and where-
abouts must be forthcoming; but if you personally and
your potential witnesses elect to remain silent through-
out the trial, we have no desire to break that silence by
any requirement of this statute.
Certainly the change in the type of crimes com-
mitted and the means used by criminals committing
them, when considered together with the safeguards
thrown about accused persons under present procedure,
justify a far different construction of the constitutional
privilege than one which might have been invoked
centuries ago. The privilege arose out of a period in
English history when there was judicial sanction of the
use of the thumbscrew and the rack for the extraction
of pleas as well as confessions.8 4  The forcing of ad-
missions of guilt from the lips of the accused by the
employment of legal process was the conduct sought
to be prevented.8 5 In the present temper of the courts
77. 206 Cal. 35, 42; 273 Pac. 767, 770.
78. For discussions of the California Insanity Law and the cases
construing it consult: Shepherd, supra, nt. 70; Chamblin, "Failure to
Plead Insanity as a Defense," (1932) 6 Cinn. L. Rev, 313, 317 ct seq.
and additional eases of People v. Marshall, 209 Cal. 540, 289 Pac. 620
(1930) and People v. Lamey, 105 Cal. App. 66, 283 Pa. 846 (1030).
79. Wigiore, Evidence (2nd. ed.) §2252.
8D. Mich. Const. art. 2, §16.
81. Ohio Const. art. 1, §10.
82. Wigmore, Evidence (2nd. ed.) §2263.
83. For detailed discussion of the privilege, see Wigmore, supra,
§§2250-2284; also Grant, "Self-Incrimination in the Modern American
Law (1931) 5 Temple L Q. 868; Corwin, "The Supreme Court's Con-
struction of the Self-Incrimination Clause," (1930) 29 Mich. L. Rev. 1;
note (1932) 41 Yale L. Jour. 618.
84. Stephen, Hist. of the Crim. Law of Eng. vol. 1, p. 297; 350;
Wigmore, supra, note 83. See also comment on the privilege in The
Philippine Penal Code, Acts, and Procedure (Revilla ed. 1930, vol. 2,
p. 1152).85. Wigniore, supra, nt. 82.
there is slight likelihood that the privilege will be
strained to invalidate such legislation as the alibi
statutes.
In conclusion it may not be out of place to indicate
some of the other proposals which have been urged in
recent years to bring about a more equitable distribution
of advantages between the state and the accused in
criminal pleading. Three of these particularly bear
mentioning. The first is a proposal to require a de-
fendant to furnish in advance of trial the names of the
witnesses he expects to call at the trial or upon failure
to do so, forfeit the right to call them. The second
is a proposal to require the defendant to submit a sched-
ule of witnesses and a brief summary of what each will
testify to.8 7 The third involves setting up in criminal
cases approximately the same system of pleading as
now prevails in civil cases under reformed procedure
in which the scope of the general issue is limited, and
the tender of a certain plea without more will consti-
tute an admission of matters not denied in the plea,
thus saving the state the necessity of proving admitted
facts."
Each of the above proposals would undoubtedly
result in an increasingly aggravated disturbance of the
defendant's now favorable balance, and each would
therefore be increasingly difficult to sustain under the
due process clause. To speculate as to the reception
which the judiciary will accord such legislation is be-
yond the scope of this article. The first proposal would
seem to involve a harsh requirement. To make a de-
fendant specify each witness he will use to establish
his innocence would seem to call for needless particular-
ization. The second proposal while subject to the same
objection, would also be a clumsy implement at best,
for no law can satisfactorily regulate the brevity of a
summary of testimony, and such summaries would
invariably disclose little of significance to the prose-
cutor. The third proposal, I fear, would lead immedi-
ately to a wild scramble to set up a system of pleading
akin to that on the civil side which has been centuries
in the making. In order to ascertain what is to be
regarded as admitted, and what denied by each of the
multitude of written defense pleadings that would be
presented to the courts, would call for thousands of
appellate court adjudications and furnish unnecessary
opportunities for delay in the administration of crim-
inal justice. It would be a costly reform.
None of these objections apply to the proposal
herein advanced that notice be given before trial of the
defense to be presented. The most brief specification
will be sufficiently informative. No counter pleadings
are called for. The issues raised by the defense would
be heard at one trial as under present procedure. But
the perjured defense and the surprise defense, neither
one of which has any justification in a serious search
into the blameworthiness of conduct, will be substan-
tially thwarted.
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